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This paper considers an economic analysis of intergenerational transition of ethnic 
and social trait.  We consider the level of social traits chosen by parents and its 
effect on their children's choice of ethnic and social traits when reaching adulthood.  
We develop a theory that suggests that parents will chose extreme ethnic and social 
traits in order to increase the cost that their children will pay if they wish to deviate 
from their parent's "ideal". The extreme choice of the ethnic social traits of parents 
has an effect on the segregation of minorities and migrants. 
  
 









Abstract:  This paper considers an economic analysis of intergenerational transition 
of ethnic and social trait.  We consider the level of social traits chosen by parents and 
its  effect  on  their  children's  choice  of  ethnic  and  social  traits  when  reaching 
adulthood.  We develop a theory that suggests that parents will chose extreme ethnic 
and social traits in order to increase the cost that their children will pay if they wish to 
deviate from their parent's "ideal". The extreme choice of the ethnic social traits of 
parents has an effect on the segregation of minorities and migrants. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we consider the transition of social practices from parents to children. 
We developed an economic framework that studies the evolution of the persistence of 
ethnic and religious traits as dynamic properties of cultural transition and socialization 
mechanisms by studying the role of the parent's choice regarding their way of life 
with regard to ethnic and social practices in the development of the cultural traits of 
their children.    
These  social  customs  take  many  forms.  The  simplest  type  to  consider  is 
religion. Parents have to decide on the level of observance of their family.  In all 
religions individuals have to choose how intensely they wish to keep the laws of their 
religion.  There are many interpretations of the laws and this enables people to choose 
different levels of observance.  For example, in Christianity the choice can be whether 
or not to go to church every Sunday, attend Mass, say grace before each meal and 
other religious activities. In Islam it could be praying five times a day, going to Mecca 
once a year, the dress code, not eating certain specific foods like pork etc. In Judiasm 
individuals can choose to keep the Sabbath by different methods (not working, not 
driving, going to the synagogue on the Sabbath etc), eat certain foods, keep different 
levels of Kashrut, decide to go to the synagogue once, twice or three times a day etc.  
However, this does not only hold for religion.  For example, a Greek immigrant to the 
USA has to decide if he will keep all the Greek traditions, will he talk Greek at home? 
will he send his kids to Sunday Greek school etc.?  The level of "observance" may 
differ from individual to individual. The choice of the observance level will have an 
effect on the children growing up in an environment that will affect their lives in the 
future.  When children grow up in a certain way they learn that this is the way that 
they should live.  Moreover, when a way of life is correlated to religion, there is a cost 
from deviating from this way of life.  Of course a deviation could also increase the 
level of observance which may prove easier than decreasing the level of observance.  
In our model, individuals live in two periods.  In the first period, children live 
with their parents.  The children are assumed to be born without well-defined cultural 
traits  which  they  acquire  from  their  parents  before  becoming  adult.    It  has  been 
extensively documented that religious and ethnic traits are usually adopted in the early 
formative years of the children's psychology and that family and role models play a 
crucial function in determining their adoption (see for example Erickson 1992, Hayes 
and Pittelkow 1993).  Parents take as given the social traits under which they grew up   2
which determine the ideal social practices and observance level they wish to uphold.  
Changing a person's traits has a cost.  For example, going every Sunday to church, 
praying a few times a day, not working on the Sabbath, not eating specific type of 
foods or at certain places, etc. all have opportunity costs. On the other hand, there are 
benefits from keeping their ideal social trait or observance level and any deviation 
also has a cost.   
Bisin and Verdier (2000) developed an economic framework that studied a 
similar type of evolution about the persistence of ethnic and religious traits and the 
role of marriage in the development of the culture traits of children.  In contrast to 
Bisin and Verdier (2000)  we look at a more basic choice of the parents which is the 
social observances chosen by them as a way of life and which has a direct effect on 
the children.   Our paper is also related to Bisin and Verdier (2001).  In their paper 
they study the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of intergenerational 
culture  transmission.    While  the  model  talks  in  general  about  transmission  of 
preferences in this paper we discuss a specific case of extremism in which the parents 
choose, in the presences of children, an extreme way of life which would not have 
been chosen in the absence of having children.  
Each parent is modeled as wishing to transmit his/her own characteristics to 
his/her children.    Parents, while choosing their actual social trait, take into account 
that  the  trait  they  choose  will  affect  their  children's  ideal  and  chosen  social 
observances. Therefore the parents, by determining the family's actual social traits, 
affect their children's choice as they grow up.     
  We intend to show in this paper that parents may choose a  more extreme 
social ideals than they would have if they didn't have children.  The reason for this is 
that they wish to create a cost for their children for deviating from their ideal.  In such 
a way the parents increase the probability that when the children become adults and 
have to choose their own way, it will be closer to that of their parents.  
Another interesting application is the theory of family interactions.  Thus, the 
"Rotten Kid Theorem", that started with Becker (1974), continues to play a living role 
in discussions about the theory of the family (see for example Bergstrom, 1989 and 
Hendrik, 2000). This theory talks about whether or not the parents can provide proper 
incentives to their "rotten kids", focusing on a situation where the objectives are not 
fully aligned across generations.  The theory talks about the head of a family, that 
cares sufficiently about all the members, transferring general resources to them so that   3
redistribution of income among them would not affect the consumption of any as long 
as he continues to contribute to all.  The major, and unexpected conclusion, is that, if 
a  head  exist,  other  members  also  are  motivated  to  maximize  family  income  and 
consumption, even if their welfare depends on their own consumption alone.  The 
present theory has some similarities to the "rotten kid" theory.  In this paper, we show 
how parents try to affect the choice of the kids to be more inline with those of the 
parents. The parents create costs for the kids so that they do not deviate too much 
from those of the parents.  This has some similarities to the "rotten kid" theory, since 
in that theory even though the kids may be selfish the parents are able to affect their 
choices by the way they contribute to the family members.   This paper's setup is just 
one important example of such interaction between parents and kids. 
This result has the same type of flavor of the analysis carried out by Glazer, 
Gradstein and Konrad (1998). Glazer, Gradstein and Konrad (1998) demonstrate that 
extreme  policies  may  appear  not  in  spite  of,  but  because  of,  political  opposition.  
More specifically, an incumbent may gain political support by adopting a policy the 
challenger is more likely to change. The awareness of voters, to the high cost of the 
more likely policy changes, induces them to support the extreme policies proposed by 
the incumbent.   
Our work adds to the blossoming literature on majority – minority conflict and 
resolution, assimilation, and the reestablishment of cultural identity (see, for example,  
Gradstein and Justman, 2005, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Anas, 2002, Bisin and 
Verdier, 2000, 2001, Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston, 2004, and Lazear, 1999). 
 
 
2.  The Model 
Individuals live in two periods.  In the first period, parents live with their children.  
The children are assumed to be born without well-defined cultural attitudes which 
they acquire from their parents before becoming adults. As in Bisin and Verdier 2000 
we assume that families have well defined preferences over culture and traits acquired 
and developed by their own children.  Further, they have access to a socialization 
technology that allows then to influence the cultural traits of their children's social 
environment. 
The payoff of individual i (i = f (farther), s (son)) is given by vi which is a 
function of three components: a. the ideal level of social traits (hereafter observance   4
level), xI,  b. the actual level of observance the individual decides to follow, xi  and c. 
the level of observance under which the individual begins with, xg.   The individual's 
payoff equals to: 
 
(1)        ( ) ( ) i g i i I i i x x c x x u v - - - - =         
 
where  ( ) i I i x x u - - is  the  individual's  utility  from  choosing  an  actual  level  of 
observance of level xi while his ideal level is xI.  The individual's utility decreases if 










 namely, deviating from the ideal point decreases the utility. It is 












 or putting it differently
2: 
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namely, if we increase the actual level of observance, xi, and get closer to the ideal 
point,  xI,  then  the  utility,  -u(.),  increases  and  if  we  increase  the  actual  level  of 
observance beyond the ideal point then the utility will decrease.     
Let us consider the second part of the individual's payoff:  ( ) i g i x x c - - .  It is 
assumed that an individual begins with a level of observance of xg. This level is given 
to him by his parents:  the way he was brought up, they way he has been doing things 
until the day he can make a decision to change his life style and observance level.  
The larger the change in observance level that the individual decides to make, either 
by increasing or decreasing, the higher the cost of adjustment. Therefore it is assumed 






















   
                                                  
2 An example of a specific utility function that incorporates all the assumptions made regarding the 
utility  of  an  individual,    ( ) ( ) i g i i I i i x x c x x u v - - - - = ,  would  be  of  the  quadratic  form: 
( ) ( )
2 2
i g i I i x x a x x v - - - - = .   5
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namely if we get closer to the given observance level xg the cost of the change are 
smaller.   
At this point we do not assume anything regarding the asymmetry between the 
utility and costs of deviation from the ideal level of observance or from the given 
level at the time of choice. It may well be that the cost and utility are not symmetric, 
namely, increasing the level of observance decreases the utility by less than the same 
change in the other direction.  We will return to this later. We assume that the change 
in the marginal cost of deviation from the ideal level of observance and from the 
given level of observance is positive.  Namely,  
 
























                  
   
An individual will choose the level of observance that maximizes his utility vi.  
The first order condition is given by:
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Thus , 
















Denote the level of observance that satisfies (6) by 
*
i x .  Consider the relationship 
between the chosen level of observance, 
*
i x , and the ideal level, xI.  It can be verified 
                                                  




































































































Therefore, the optimal level of observance is a positive function of the ideal level of 
observance.  In a similar way we can show that the optimal level of observance is a 
positive function of the given level of observance,  g x .  Thus: 
 



















The given level of observance  g x  is the level that the parents pass on to their 
children.  If  the  father's  ideal  point  is  equal  to  his  given  level  of  observance, 
g I x x = then it is clear that the father will choose the level of observance that equals 
his  given  observance  which  in  itself  equals  the  ideal  level  of  observance: 
g I i x x x = =
*  .  However, if the son's ideal observance level differs from the actual 
level  of  observance  of  his  parents,  then  the  son  will  decide  on  a  level  that  will 
probably not equal the actual level of his parents.  
Let us now consider a two generation model of a father and son.  The son 
chooses his optimal level of observance given the actual level he grows up with (i.e. 
his father's actual choice).  The son, in our story, only takes into account his own 
utility and does not consider his children's utility.  The ideal level for the father is xI, 
however, he knows that any level he chooses will affect his son when he makes his 
choice.   The father does not only take into consideration his own utility but also his 
son's utility.  Moreover, the ideal level of observance for the father is xI and it is 
assumed that the father also believes this would be the ideal level for his son.  This   7
may  not  be  the  case.    The  father  may  wish  to  affect  the  son's  ideal  point  by 
determining  the  actual  level  of  observance.    This  will  have  the  same  affect  as 
affecting the actual point at which the son begins. This would not change our main 
results. To simplify we assume that the father believes that the ideal level for the son 
is his own ideal point and around this point he calculates the son's utility. The father's 
utility from the son's choice is relative to his own ideal level and not to his son's actual 
ideal level.   Our main results would not change if the son also takes into account the 
effect his choice has on his own children. To summarize, the son takes into account 
one period forward while the father two periods.  
The father's utility over the two periods is given by, 
   
(9)    ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { } s f s s I s f g f f I f f x x c x x u x x c x x u V - - - - + - - - - =              
 
where f for father and s for son and  ( ) ( ) f g f f I f x x c x x u - - - - is the direct utility of 
the  father  (given  by  (1))  not  taking  into  account  the  son's  utility  and  
( ) ( ) s i s s I s x x c x x u - - - -  is the son's utility in the eyes of the father. Remember that 
the father believes the ideal level of observance for himself and for his son is at a 
level  of  xI.  Therefore,  when  the  father  calculates  the  son's  utility  it  is  calculated 
around the ideal point xI.  
  The  son,  on  the  other  hand,  determines  his  optimal  observance  level  in 
accordance with (1) where his given level of observance is 
*
f g x x = .  From (1)-(8) it is 
clear that the son will choose an observance level which is related to the father's level:  
( ) f s x x










.  Moreover the son's optimal level of observance is a 











x .  The ideal level is a function 
of  two  main  components:  the  actual  level  that  one  was  educated  to  and  outside 
conditions (the level of assimilation of the minority, the possibility of intermarriage, 
and the way the majority accepts or rejects the minorities (see for example Epstein 
and Gang, 2006 ).  To simplify our analysis we assume that  
 
(10)          e x x f s + =
*                                                        8
 
Latter on we discuss the determinacy of e. 
The father's problem is therefore to maximize 
 
 (11)       ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } f s f s f s I s f g f f I f f x x x c x x x u x x c x x u V
* * - - - - + - - - - =  
 
which becomes  
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The first order condition is given by  
 





























                    
 
(13) is satisfied if  
 





















                          
 
  If the father's ideal point is equal to the given level of observance,  g I x x = and 
if the son also sees his father's level of observance as his own ideal level,  Is I x x =  
then it is clear that the father and the son will have the same observance level.    
  We now wish to compare the level of observance that a father will choose 
when  ignoring  and,  afterwards,  not  ignoring  his  son's  utility.  Denote  the  level  of 
observances  that  maximizes  the  father's  utility  when  he  does  not  take  into 
consideration the effect on his son's utility by 
*
f x , (i.e. 
*
f x  is the level that maximizes 
equation (1):  
* *
f i x x = ) and the level of observance when he takes into account his 
son's utility into consideration by 
* *
f x .   Denote by 
0 e the level under which  
* * *
f f x x =  
therefore from (6) and (14) it is clear that 
0 * e x x I f - = .  In the case we described   9
before where the son's ideal point is that of his father's and the given observance level 
equals his ideal level then e=0  and xI = 
*
f x .    
From (14) together with the assumptions (2) and (3) we obtain that, 
 
(15)          
* * * 0







                  
 
3.  Discussion 
This paper has studied the cultural transmission of an ethnic or social trait. The main 
contributions of the model with respect to the existing literature are twofold: 1. the 
trait is a continuous variable, "observance," and 2. the interaction between parents 
socialization and the children's identity choice determine the children's trait.    
The  results  presented  above  depend  on  the  level  of  e.    The  level  of  e  is 
determined by many factors. For example, a Moslem living in the USA will have a 
different level of e than an identical Moslem living in an Arab Moslem country.  The 
level of assimilation of the minority, the possibility of intermarriage, and the way the 
majority accepts or rejects the minorities will all determine the ideal observance level 
for the son.     
As a result of different levels of e as a result of exogenous circumstances parents 
may choose a more extreme observance (social traits) than they would have if they 
didn't have children.  The reason for this is that they wish to create a cost for their 
children  for  deviating  from  their  ideal.    In  such  a  way  the  parents  increase  the 
probability that when the children become adults and have to choose their own way, it 
will be closer to that of their parents. 
As we stated above the utility functions are not always symmetric.  A believer, 
who decides to choose  a certain observance level, would probably prefer that his 
children  choose  to  be  more  observant  rather  than  less.  This  would  mean  that  we 
would tend to see more extremes, towards a higher level of observance.    
Such analysis of the socialization has natural implications for the dynamics of 
the behavior of minorities, with ethnic and religious traits, in the population. In the 
basic model, the population dynamics converge to a heterogeneous limit distribution, 
in  which  minorities  are  never  completely  assimilated.    However,  in  a  more   10
generalized  dynamic  model,  it  is  not  clear  if  minorities  necessarily  persist.    The 
persistence,  of  minorities  and  assimilation,  depends  on  many  factors  such  as  the 
majority attitudes and  minority desires. There  is a conflict, or at least a potential 
conflict, between the majority and the minority/migrants over their position in the 
economy and in society. This potential conflict is acute between the majority and the 
minority, and as we have seen, may also exist within the minority community (see 
Epstein  and  Gang,  2006,  Gradstein  and  Schiff,  2006  and  Gradstein  and  Justman, 
2005).  The majority’s attitude, towards minorities, is the majority group welcoming, 
and is there an attempt made to integrate minorities?. The minorities, on the other 
hand,  desire to integrate and the willingness of minority determine the degree of 
integration.   Income, and the standard of living, may well have an impact on the 
willingness of the minorities to assimilate, and thus change their ideal social traits or 
they may be willing to compromise, since the cost of deviating may decrease as a 
result of an increase in earnings. Thus they may wish to increase their utility via an 
increase in earnings rather than keeping to their ideal traits.  If the majority feels 
threatened by the minorities, in terms of work displacement and wage decreases, the 
majority group may harasses the minorities, by not cooperating with them, in order to 
forestall and prevent this, or at least to keep the gains from the process out of the 
hands of minorities.   This may have an impact on the compromise the minority is 
willing to make with regard to its ideal social traits, which, on one hand, would be 
strengthened by becoming more extreme, or, on the other hand, weakened in order to 
minimize the resistance of the majority.  This, of course, would also depend on the 
intergenerational links and the intensity of socialization of the minority group.
4  The 
stronger the links are the less is needed in terms of extremism and thus, over time, it is 
not  clear  that  minorities  persist.    Historical  evidence  has  shown  us  that  some 
minorities do persist while others do not.  For example, some Jews and Moslem in the 
Diaspora have assimilated into the local population, while others have chosen to keep 
practicing  their  heritage.  Our  paper  shows  that,  in  order  to  keep  their  identity, 
extremism is needed by the parents, to help their children to hold on to the same type 
of ideal social traits.  
 
                                                  
4 The values of e and xI would change accordingly.   11
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